Law/culture: power, politics and the political by Campbell E
Newcastle University e-prints  
Date deposited:  18th October 2012 
Version of file:  Published 
Peer Review Status: Peer reviewed 
Citation for item: 
Campbell E. Law/culture: power, politics and the political. International Journal of Criminology and 
Sociology 2012, 1(1), 1-12. 
Further information on publisher website: 
http://www.lifescienceglobal.com 
Publisher’s copyright statement: 
© Lifescience Global, 2012. 
‘Reproduced with the permission of the copyright holders.’  
The definitive version of this article is available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.6000/1929-4409.2012.01.1 
Always use the definitive version when citing.   
Use Policy: 
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced and given to third parties in any format or medium, 
without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not for profit 
purposes provided that: 
• A full bibliographic reference is made to the original source 
• A link is made to the metadata record in Newcastle E-prints 
• The full text is not changed in any way. 
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders. 
 
 Robinson Library, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne.  
NE1 7RU.  Tel. 0191 222 6000 
 International Journal of Criminology and Sociology, 2012, 1, 1-12 1
 E-ISSN: 1929-4409/12  © 2012 Lifescience Global 
Law/Culture: Power, Politics and the Political 
Elaine Campbell*
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Abstract: This paper is concerned with the dialectical relationship of law and culture. Recent academic work in the 
sociology of law positions such a relationship within a concept of power, specifically the power of law/culture to render 
the world meaningful not only in reciprocally constitutive ways but also in mutually deconstructive ways. While this kind 
of scholarship moves us some way beyond accounts which insist on law and culture as autonomous realms of human 
experience, it has created a context of consensus which is largely uncritical of their relationalities. Whilst not denying 
moments of creative synergy which emerge in productive and positive relations of mutuality, this discussion re-opens old 
antagonisms, and revisits law/culture as an ongoing contest and a dichotomous struggle over meaning, interpretation 
and judgement. I make use of a (familiar) Foucauldian vocabulary to delineate three modalities of power - sovereign, 
disciplinary and discursive – and use this as a framework for critically interrogating how law/culture stages different kinds 
of politics, which have varying effects in the broader political field of ‘justice’. The paper concludes by arguing for both a 
modified and an intensified approach to power which builds on the conceptual insights of an eclectic body of 
contemporary political theoretical work.
Keywords: Law, culture, politics, power, representation, Foucault, Rancière.
INTRODUCTION 
How do we figure the relationality of law and 
culture? For some, it should not be figured at all and 
what is called for is ‘an ongoing and mutual rupturing – 
the undoing of one term by the other’ (Coombe, 2001: 
21) so as to displace their reification as autonomous 
spheres of human endeavour. For others, there is little 
sense in delineating the interconnections of law and 
culture given the ‘spectacular intractability of the things 
to be related’ (Fitzpatrick, 2005: 3). Despite this, the 
question of relationality is both the hallmark of and 
remains central to theoretical work in what Sarat and 
Simon talk of as the ‘postrealist legal landscape’ (2003: 
4) incorporating critical (feminist, postcolonial and 
queer) legal studies, the law and literature movement, 
as well as the post-critiques of law and society which 
make use of deconstructionist, psychoanalytical and 
genealogical perspectives (Ewick and Silbey, 1998; 
Gaines, 1991; Hutchings, 2001; Leonard, 1995; 
MacNeil, 2007; Redhead, 1995; Sarat and Kearns, 
1993, 2001; Sarat and Simon, 2003; Sherwin, 2000, 
2006; Young, 2005). Across this diverse literature there 
are, broadly speaking, two key frameworks at play. The 
first subscribes to a constitutive theory of law. For 
example, and preferring the phrase ‘law as culture’, 
Mezey notes: 
This conceptualization is related more 
generally to what many in sociolegal 
studies call a constitutive theory of law, in  
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which law is recognized as both 
constituting and being constituted by 
social relations and cultural practices. In 
other words … (l)aw participates in the 
production of meanings within the shared 
semiotic system of a culture, but it is also 
a product of that culture and the practices 
that reproduce it. A constitutive theory of 
law rejects law’s claim to autonomy and its 
tendency toward self-referentiality (2001: 
46-47). 
Emphasised here is a relationship of symbolic, 
performative and discursive exchange where meanings 
are produced, consumed, challenged and negotiated in 
and through practices and processes of cultural and 
legal signification. As Sarat and Kearns comment: 
‘Meaning is perhaps the key term in the vocabulary of 
those who speak about the cultural lives of law, of 
those who seek to connect the word and the world’ 
(2001: 6, Original emphasis). A second perspective, 
however, is less concerned with meaning-making 
within a mixed economy of semiotic resources, and is 
more focused on commonalities and similitude in legal 
and cultural form. It is an orientation which finds 
expression in much of the work concerned with law and 
aesthetics (Butler, 2003; Douzinas and Nead, 1999; 
Gearey, 2001; Manderson, 2001; Young, 2005). For 
example, in posing the question of how to imagine the 
relation between law and art, Young argues that: 
‘Similarities can be identified, and thus we proceed by 
means of the relations of resemblance, similarity and 
substitution – that is, of metaphor’ (2005: 11). Since 
‘law is an aesthetic enterprise’ (Schlag, 2002: 1049), its 
architectural styles, ritual practices, modes of dress 
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and address can all be read as forms of cultural 
expression; at the same time, it is argued, the legal 
imaginary of artistic practice and aesthetic expertise 
can be found in the working knowledges, rules and 
conventions of the creative arts. Putting this somewhat 
poetically, Schlag states `that law paints its order of 
pain and death on human beings with no more ethical 
warrant or rational grounding than an artist who applies 
paint to canvas (2002: 1050, Emphasis added). 
Both the constitutive and similitude perspectives 
create a context of relative consensus about 
law/culture wherein old antagonisms about their 
intersectionalities have given way to a productive and 
positive politics of mutuality. Indeed, Coombe, eschews 
what she terms ‘a metaphysics of political presence’ 
(2001: 36) and calls for a culturally materialist approach 
which not only insists on foregrounding the historical 
contingencies and spatial particularities of law/culture, 
but which also tracks how, through the flows and 
nuances of their interrelationality, the concept acquires 
new political valencies and resonances – relations of 
mutuality and alliance, of accommodation and 
compromise, and of enlightenment and enrichment, for 
example. At the same time, Young’s (2005) work on 
the relationship of law and aesthetics rejects 
conventional readings which portray their conjunction 
as a ‘series of encounters in which …. the relation 
between legal studies and aesthetics is usually 
constructed as a hierarchy between two unequal 
parties’ (2005: 11). Young prefers the notion of co-
implication, seeing it as better equipped to capture the 
complexities and fluidities of a coupling ‘in which law 
and the image are enfolded within each other, their 
contours and substances passing through and around 
each other’ (2005: 10). It could be argued, then, that 
law/culture has entered a post-political phase in which 
any sense of a dichotomous struggle between 
opposing camps appears to have been transcended. 
Nonetheless, as Fitzpatrick complains, law/culture 
intersectionality continues to be provocative and has an 
‘edgy quality’ which suggests that ‘the relation of law to 
culture remains “disputed” and “uneasy”’ (2005: 2). 
There is certainly no agreement that such a coupling 
makes a desirable or necessary contribution to the 
legal canon, nor that such an interdisciplinary focus 
does and should authorise the way that law is 
practised, taught and theorised (Brooks, 2003). This is 
not to devalue or obviate the important insights of 
mutuality and co-implication but to signal that there 
remains a tension at the heart of law/culture which 
politicises the (inter-)disciplinary field. What concerns 
me here is the extent to which this sense of 
politicisation has been played down or minimised in a 
way which obscures continuing partisan quarrels and 
turf wars over boundaries, the production of meaning 
and forms of knowledge. Consequently, law/culture 
relationality is rarely (these days) positioned within an 
arena of conflict, or figured within a politics of 
contestation over representation, interpretation, 
governance and judgement. Yet, the persistence of a 
more contentious relationship is noted by Sarat and 
Kearns: they state: 
Law’s cultural lives and its power in and 
over cultural production are continually 
renewed, re-created, defended, and 
modified. But they are also consistently 
resisted, limited, altered, challenged. 
Law’s cultural lives are, as a result, not 
placid and calm. They are alive with the 
push and pull of contestation (2001: 8). 
In light of this, it is not so much that consensus 
perspectives of law/culture intersectionalities are 
`wrong’, so much as they are partial and, importantly, 
have become disengaged from the kind of critical work 
which interrogates how power circulates and 
punctuates the ebb and flow of the legal-cultural terrain 
transforming it into a political minefield. To be sure, 
there is now an abundance of insightful and innovative 
analyses which bring together these two frameworks of 
inquiry – the legal and the cultural – to address thorny 
questions concerning, for example, justice, rights, 
security, citizenship and equality; and following 
MacNeil (2007: 156), it may be widely accepted that 
this kind of epistemological dialogue constitutes a 
‘mode of theorizing and method of explication’ which 
allows us to read cultural texts jurisprudentially, and 
conversely to read legal texts aesthetically. It is also 
the case that such accounts pay good attention to the 
ways in which these intersectionalities have 
reconfigured the juridico-cultural landscape suggestive 
of an activist and reformist orientation which has 
political transformation in its sights. Despite this, there 
has been a marked reluctance to engage with 
theoretical perspectives on power to make critical 
sense of the dialectical and dynamic political spaces of 
law/culture relationalities. In short, law/culture 
scholarship has lost touch with its critical imaginary. 
This paper begins the task of opening up to scrutiny the 
politics of the law/culture interface, regarding it as a key 
surface of emergence for the exercise of power, the 
staging of a politics, and the opening up of a political 
field marked by antagonism, resistance and opposition. 
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In the next several sections, I undertake something of a 
ground-clearing task by unpacking the configurations of 
power which currently permeate the law/culture 
scholarship, making explicit the range of political 
frameworks and (un)critical perspectives which are 
implied by them. This clears a space for re-thinking the 
potential for re-politicising law/culture’s critical terrain 
as well as our political commitments to law/culture 
intersectionalities. The paper concludes, then, by 
sketching out both a modified and intensified approach 
to power which builds on the conceptual insights of an 
eclectic body of contemporary political theoretical work.  
SOVEREIGN POWER 
A useful starting point for understanding law/culture 
relationalities as a political field, is Golder’s and 
Fitzpatrick’s (2009) exegetical account of Foucault’s 
Law. In this eloquent and timely text, Golder and 
Fitzpatrick remind us of Foucault’s insistence on the 
relational nature of power, and it is this aspect which 
makes reference to Foucault so fitting in this context; 
they state:  
The law, which in certain positivist 
accounts is rendered in autonomous and 
hermetically sealed terms, is here 
described by Foucault in relational terms. 
The law… is not so much the putatively 
contained entity that we have come to 
expect from these positivist accounts; 
rather the condition of law is that of a 
perpetual hyphenation, reliant in some 
measure upon `the scientific’, ‘the 
epistemological’, and `the anthropological’ 
to give it some purchase …. – ‘the 
political’ also figures significantly in this 
relation….. Foucault’s law is anything but 
a law unto itself. Rather, in his 
understanding, the law and the powers 
apart from it would seem to be relationally 
interdependent (2009: 60-61). 
Foucault’s analytic is not introduced here to bring 
ontological clout to the proposition of law/culture as a 
relationality of power. Rather, it is to preface my 
exploitation of the familiarity of Foucault’s conceptual 
vocabulary, which is invoked on this occasion as an 
ordering matrix for the purposes of exposition. Tacit 
alignment with notions of sovereign, disciplinary and 
discursive power percolate under and through the 
surface of law/culture texts; at such junctures, the 
political terrain of law/culture shows up in sharp relief. 
Taking each of these modalities of power in turn, this 
section begins the task by casting a critical eye over 
law/culture and sovereign power. 
The figuration of law/culture as a relationality 
emerging from and (re-)produced through the exercise 
of sovereign power looms large within socio-legal 
research concerned with cultural justice. Consider, for 
example, Ross’s (2001) delineation of the struggle for 
cultural recognition, considered here as indicative, 
rather than representative, of this strand of scholarship. 
Borrowing Taylor’s (1994) concept of a ‘politics of 
recognition’, Ross positions law/culture, as a political 
relationship, within a ‘landscape of globalization’ (2001: 
206) where proprietary rights `over language, religion, 
and traditional practices … including Native 
jurisprudence` (2001: 206) are asserted and claimed by 
cultural minorities ‘threatened with extinction by 
majoritarian forces’ (2001: 206). It is a landscape, 
moreover, which is infused with and shaped by 
repressive modalities of power - conflict, control, 
domination, resistance and exploitation. Ross 
persuasively and incisively documents the limits of 
‘affirmative justice’, noting how constitutional 
protections – enshrined in race-conscious legislation, 
the ‘ordinary principles of law’ (2001: 212), ‘the fair play 
scenario’ (2001: 211) – are neutralised, in practice, and 
turned on their head to buttress a monoculturalist 
agenda forged in the name of national identity, 
heritage, and shared values. Overt political 
commitments to multiculturalism, bilingualism, political 
correctness and civil rights, and formal recognition of 
cultural diversity and difference within liberal 
democratic polities, Ross argues, merely service ‘a 
prescription for segregationism (which) masquerades 
as tolerance for human variation’ (2001: 226). There is 
considerable merit in Ross’s insightful and critical 
overview of what passes for (and what might count as) 
cultural justice within a framework of positive, 
affirmative action
1
. As Dillon and Valentine comment: 
The logarithm of this enterprise is 
condensed in the opposition between 
homogeneity and identity, and 
heterogeneity and difference, where the 
latter terms designate the character of the 
dominated and excluded, and stand for 
everything that should be affirmed by a 
morally justified political project (2002: 5). 
                                           
1
It should be noted that Ross rejects the commitment to an affirmative justice in 
favour of a transformative approach which ‘involves a deep restructuring of the 
relations of production, in the economic sphere, and the relations of 
recognition, in the cultural sphere’ (2001: 205). 
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Dillon and Valentine, however, articulate a 
tendency, which is woven through Ross’s account, as 
well as critical legal-cultural studies more generally, to 
invoke a sovereign model of power as the organising 
principle of (affirmative) cultural politics. Such a 
schema remains problematic, not least because it 
forecloses more complex questions about the political 
cartography of law/culture relationalities. That is to say, 
despite a political field with several configurative 
possibilities, law/culture is repeatedly mapped across a 
dichotomous terrain which aligns the former with the 
geo-political (and socio-economic) interests of national 
territories, regional blocs, trading partnerships, 
inter/cross-national institutions and the state; and the 
latter with the cultural dynamics and aspirations of civil 
society, local communities, ‘the street’ (Ross, 2001: 
225) and everyday cultural settings. Within a 
framework of ‘popular sovereignty’ (Singer and Weir, 
2006: 446)
2
, law/culture as a political relationship 
involves, then, an ongoing conflict between opposing 
and differently empowered camps in which the 
transformation of cultural actors into legal subjects – 
with rights and obligations, freedoms and protections - 
is at stake. At the same time, to all intents and 
purposes given an ‘entrenched resistance to change’ 
(Ross, 2001: 21), this conflict does not conform to the 
‘fair play scenario’ beloved of legal liberalism; at the 
interstices of law/culture, cultural identities and 
practices enter into politics only via the concessionary 
exercise of law’s sovereign power.  
In the struggle for cultural recognition within a legal 
order, the terms and conditions of political agency are 
set by law. While important advances are made in the 
cause of rights and recognitions for minority groups, 
institutional hierarchies and vested interests remain 
largely unchanged; what appear to be gains and 
triumphs, and the imprint of culture on the legal 
landscape, are merely markers of law’s assimilation 
and accommodation of cultural diversity. It perpetuates 
what Dean (2011: 75) describes as the `fantasy of 
politics’ wherein the continuing disavowal of its own 
antagonistic dynamic – law/culture - engenders a de-
politicised situation in which `everyone and everything 
is included, respected, valued and entitled. No one is 
made to feel uncomfortable. Everyone is heard and 
seen and recognized and has a place at the table’ (ibid:
                                           
2
In their critical re-reading of the politics of sovereign power, Singer and Weir 
comment on Foucault’s (1980: 105, 2003: 37) brief references to the 
democratization of sovereignty in later modernity; they state: ‘Later juridical 
systems, at the level of both legal codes and normative political theory, 
democratized sovereignty by linking it with public right, i.e. popular sovereignty’ 
(2006: 446). 
75). As Dean goes onto argue, the ‘fantasy of politics’ 
resonates with mainstream concerns about the end of 
ideology, the rise of consensus politics and the crisis of 
de-democratization; it also reflects the de-politicization 
theses of critical political theory. As  i!ek notes, `the 
political act (intervention) proper …. changes the very 
framework that determines how things work’ (1999: 
199, original emphasis); while Rancière comments that 
`politics is not the exercise of power’ (2010: 27), but 
emerge when the contingency and arbitrariness of the 
legal order is exposed by ` the sudden [brutale]
revelation of the ultimate anarchy on which any 
hierarchy rests’ (Rancière, 1999: 16, original 
emphasis). Davis’s reading of Rancière’s 
Disagreement sums this up neatly: ‘Politics 
embarrasses the police order by seeing through the 
imaginary garments of elaborate hierarchy which cover 
its naked contingency’ (2010: 79).  
DISCIPLINARY POWER 
To position law/culture within the tensions of 
repressive, negative modes of juridical power elides the 
productive and formative capacities of their 
intersectionalities; and for that strand of socio-legal 
work which seeks out the generative power of 
law/culture, alternative political landscapes are brought 
into view. I am thinking here of analyses which critically 
interrogate law/culture’s complicity in the adjudication, 
normalisation, moralisation and surveillance of the 
body and its comportments, the classicus locus for the 
exercise of disciplinary power (Valverde, 2003). In the 
original Foucauldian formulation: 
The body is …. directly involved in a 
political field; power relations have an 
immediate hold upon it; they invest it, 
mark it, train it, torture it ….. This political 
investment of the body is bound up, in 
accordance with complex reciprocal
relations, with its economic use; it is 
largely as a force of production that the 
body is invested with relations of power 
and domination; but, on the other hand, its 
constitution as labour power is possible 
only if it is caught up in a system of 
subjection … the body becomes a useful 
force only if it is both a productive body 
and a subjected body (Foucault, 1977: 24-
25, Emphasis added). 
From this vantage point, the politics of law/culture 
are captured, held within a relationship of reciprocality, 
and are grounded in the sites and surfaces of the 
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corporeal. But what are we to make of the notion of 
reciprocality – elsewhere described as collusive, 
mutually reinforcing, converging - as the motor force of 
a political field. It is a turn of phrase which altogether 
obviates the tensions, disagreements and 
argumentation inherent to law/culture’s co-production 
of the disciplined body and the disciplined subject, as 
well as their equidistance from the disciplinary sciences 
(psychology, medicine, economics, sociology, 
pedagogy, criminology, for example) which compete for 
space in this crowded political arena. Whether we are 
concerned with the subject-ed bodies of non-
consensual, invasive surgery (Smith, 2000), or the 
consumers of ‘extreme pornography’ (Johnson, 2010), 
or female, Muslim asylum seekers (Hua, 2010), what is 
at stake is not the recognition of juridical-cultural 
subjects per se – as competent, moral and/or 
persecuted people with rights to refuse treatment, to 
enjoy freedom of expression, or to be granted asylum – 
but the claim to possess (and apply) an expert 
knowledge and understanding of their capacities 
(moral, social, economic, ethical, discursive, material 
and behavioural), to participate in political life. Put 
another way, given this joint enterprise to know, 
produce and adjudicate ‘the subject of rights’, the 
politics of law/culture emerge in and through the cut 
and thrust of epistemological and methodological 
exchange.  
There is no space here to fully elaborate the 
frameworks of inquiry which inform and authorise 
modes of legal and cultural knowledge production
3
; but 
this is less important than a consideration of the power 
effects of their (inter-)relationalities at the 
epistemological level. Hua’s (2010) account of the 
asylum claims of Iranian women in the US courts, is 
instructive here. For Hua, such claims pivot on the 
ontological question of who qualifies as a ‘persecuted 
subject’, and are settled with reference to both legal 
and cultural insights. Based on six exemplary cases
4
,
she powerfully deconstructs law/culture 
intersectionalities as sites of contradiction and paradox 
which expose ‘the fundamental conundrum of human 
rights …. (that is) the competing desire to uphold 
                                           
3
On legal method, see, for example, Anderson, Reinsmith-Jones and Mangels 
(2011); Hesselink (2009); Mossman (1987). On cultural theory and analysis 
see, for example, Bennett (1998); Giles and Middleton (2008); Smith (2001). 
For a good account of how, in practice, disciplinary epistemologies may be 
conflated, see Grazin (2004) and Zacharias (2011).  
4
Fatin v INS (12 F.3d 1233, 1993); Safaie v INS (25 F.3d 636, 641 n.1, 1994); 
Fisher v INS (79 F.3d 955, 1996); Sharif v INS (87 F.3d 932, 1996); Yadegar-
Sargis v INS (297 F.3d 596, 2002); Mazhari-Ravesh v Gonzales (135 Fed. 
Appx. 71, 2005). 
universal principles … while at the same time 
simultaneously disavowing and celebrating relativism’ 
(2010: 377). That is to say, in the way that legal 
arguments take account of cultural (and racialized) 
difference, and in the kind of cultural evidence which is 
sought (Islamic dress codes, patriarchal practices, 
markers of violence, persecutory narratives), the 
adjudication of women’s right to asylum pushes 
petitioners to `a place where they must reiterate 
troubling arguments of their own cultural 
“backwardness”’ (2010: 376). This kind of analysis 
suggests that there is an irreconcilability at the heart of 
law/culture which is not best represented as a 
relationship based on reciprocal exchange. Even so, 
Hua does not subscribe to a ‘cultural justice’ 
perspective which sees law/culture as contestative and 
oppositional; nor even to Berman’s optimistic view of 
culture as a corrective which enables law to tell ‘a less 
suspicious story’ (2003: 105). Rather, there is a 
recognition within this work, and other studies, of the 
presence of law/culture’s ‘constitutive negation’ 
(Fitzpatrick, 1992: Chapter 1) from which there are 
likely to be no clear winners. As Hua puts it: 
(T)he very notion of universality is 
constituted through the concept of 
particularism. While the concepts are 
defined in opposition to each other, they 
are nonetheless mutually constitutive. Any 
claim to universalism necessitates the 
simultaneous disavowal and recognition of 
particularity. It is no wonder neither 
position challenges the neo-colonial 
operations of racial power at work (2010: 
390). 
However, the notion of `constitutive negation’ 
altogether understates the power dynamics of the 
universalism/particularism (law/culture) dyad. Hua quite 
rightly points to the contradictions of legal redress and 
claims-making on behalf of particular cultural subjects, 
but does not regard these as indicators of the limits of 
law/culture relationalities and the basis for critical 
reflexivity of their political fit. In other words, 
reciprocality and common cause in adjudicating the 
legal-cultural subject in the name of justice, minority 
protections or cultural freedoms sits uncomfortably 
within universalist frameworks which may be 
homophobic, patriarchal, racist or imperialist. Mirroring 
Ranciere’s (1992) comments on the political spaces of 
democracy, this treats the interstices of law/culture as 
habitat rather than a locus of struggle, `as an ambient 
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milieu’ (1992: 22) rather than the setting for political 
challenge and dissent.  
DISCURSIVE POWER 
MacNeil’s (2007) Lex Populi: The Jurisprudence of 
Popular Culture opens with an impressive `”Cook’s 
tour” of contemporary interdisciplinary scholarship in 
progressive law’ (2007: 7). Noting the contributions of 
North American (especially the US), European 
(particularly the UK) and Australian research, and 
taking account of the contours and folds of its 
development over time and space, MacNeil pays 
tribute to critical socio-legal work which crosses the 
boundaries between law and literature, art, film, 
aesthetics, music, architecture, television, and popular 
culture (Butler, 2003; Chase, 2002; Greenfield and 
Osborn, 2001; Haldar, 1999; Hutchings, 2001; 
Manderson, 2000; Rapping, 2003; Schlag, 2002; 
Sherwin, 2000; Threadgold, 1997; Turner and Williams, 
1994; Young, 2005). For MacNeil, ‘”culture” has 
replaced “critique” as not only le mot juste but also the 
fulchrum of millennial legal studies’ (2007: 7). This is a 
bold claim, especially when it is backed up with the 
further anticipation that we are entering a post-
theoretical era characterised by a ‘distinctive mode and 
a new mise-en-scène of interpretation …… the 
Imaginary of global popular culture’ (2007: 8). There is 
clearly no shortage of work which might fulfil such 
promise
5
, and its intellectual credentials to fashion a 
critical paradigm of culturo-legal research is not at 
issue here. Of greater concern, is how the politics of 
such an endeavour are being staged and framed. 
At the risk of running roughshod over the nuances 
of a rich and diverse portfolio of interdisciplinary 
research, I want to suggest a shared focus on the 
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There are now a substantial number of edited volumes which bring together a 
range of popular cultural research studies (Fineman and McCluskey, 1997; 
Moran et al., 2004; Sarat and Kearns, 2001; Sherwin, 2001; Thornton, 2002); 
this is in addition to a proliferation of research monographs which explore and 
develop specific analytical foci for interpreting ‘the legal’ culturally, and ‘the 
cultural’ legally (Brown, 2009; MacNeil, 2007; Redhead, 1995; Valverde 2006; 
Young, 2005). To this we can add the calendar of established annual 
conferences and symposia, dedicated to the furtherance of an international 
law/culture scholarship – Conference of the Association for the Study of Law, 
Culture and the Humanities (coming into its 16
th
 year in March 2012); 
Intersections of Law and Culture Conference (Frankin College, Switzerland), 
and the annual conferences hosted by the Legal Intersections Research 
Centre at the University of Wollongong. The depth and breadth of this 
interdisciplinary field is also traced through the publication of journals which 
foreground the interface of law and culture – Law and Critique (Springer); Law 
and Literature (University of California Press); Law, Culture and the 
Humanities: An Interdisciplinary Journal (Sage); Law, Text, Culture (University 
of Wollongong); as well as the regular appearance of law/culture articles within 
a range of academic journals – Crime, Media, Culture (Sage); Law and Society 
Review (Blackwell); Social and Legal Studies (Sage); Theory, Culture and 
Society (Sage); Theoretical Criminology (Sage); Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities (Yale Law School).  
constitutive power of law/culture relationalities. As 
Mezey notes in her elaboration of the mutally 
constitutive nature of law/culture: 
law as culture and culture as law …. 
(means) showing the ways in which law is 
one of the signifying practices that 
constitute culture and vice versa …. (It) 
envisions an unstable synthesis between 
the two, formed by a continuous recycling 
and rearticulation of legal and cultural 
meanings’ (2001: 38). 
Though varying in their scope and emphasis, 
constitutive accounts are primarily centred on an 
exposition of ‘discourse’ as the site of political 
meaning-making, where ‘discourse’ incorporates a 
range of representational forms (imagery, speech, text, 
performance, material culture and sound). Valverde 
(2006), for example, draws attention to the ways in 
which visual (film, television, photography, finger-print 
technology, DNA profiling), literary (novels), and 
material (statues, windows) cultures collectively nurture 
and privilege different forms of legal and criminological 
knowledge. She talks of the ‘forensic gaze’ of this host 
of cultural media, in as far as their combined discursive 
effects are to mobilise and perpetuate faith in the 
authority of legal/criminal justice expertise. Brown 
makes a similar argument in her analysis of cultural 
representations of penality; but she talks more 
forcefully of the political transformation of an imagined 
audience who are not only moved from the ‘passivity of 
penal spectatorship to an informed and engaged mode 
of citizenship’ (2009: 191), but are also, through that 
process, tacitly embroiled in the disciplinary gaze of the 
penal landscape. Travis (2011), on the other hand, 
sees popular cultural media – specifically, science 
fiction film - as performing ‘an essentially 
epistemological function’ (Travis, 2011: 252) wherein 
‘science fiction becomes the source of meaning, and 
the language in which society discusses new legal 
challenges’ (Travis, 2011: 252). Indeed, much of this 
strand of research, regards law/culture as a venue for 
theoretical and political inquiry; as a discursive, or 
intertextual space in which core issues relating to legal 
reasoning, jurisprudence, methodology and judgement 
can be interrogated – see, for example, Friedman, 
1989; Greenfield and Osborn, 1995; Sherwin, 2000; 
Rosenberg, 2001; Chase, 2002; Seymour, 2004; 
MacNeil, 2007. Alternatively, constitutive approaches 
also point to a politics of assimilation, and question the 
importation of cultural frames of reference into legal 
practice, especially within the courtroom (Meyer, 2001; 
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Mezey, 2001; Zacharias, 2011). Of interest here is how 
cinematic tropes, cultural idioms and narrative forms 
are increasingly built into the discursive architecture of 
legal argumentation, judicial decision-making and 
evidential presentation; as Meyer notes of the thirteen 
week trial of United States v Bianco
6
: ‘The stories in 
that trial presented a remarkably complex interweaving 
of plots, counterplots, and subplots. There was drama, 
speculation as to motive and meaning, alternative 
visualizations of the past: a carnival of theatricality and 
storytelling’ (2001: 147).  
Despite the multiple merits of this variegated body 
of work, the constitutive model advances a relatively 
impoverished political analysis of law/culture 
intersectionalities. There are two key aporia relevant to 
the discussion at hand. The first concerns a tendency 
to be guided by a ‘politics of representation’ without any 
reflexivity about or critical engagement with the 
problematic of representationalism as a political 
strategy; the second centres on the failure to 
adequately theorise processes of political 
subjectivation. Taking each of these points in turn. In 
recent years, cultural geographers have questioned the 
ontological and epistemological wherewithal of 
representationalist approaches, and call for a 
perspective informed by nonrepresentational theory 
(NRT). Primarily associated with the work of Nigel Thrift 
(1996, 1997, 1999, 2000), this is a framework which 
eschews the established precepts of representational 
accounts – that is, the objectification of 
representational form and content; adherence to 
processes of categorisation; the search for stable 
identities and fixed essences; and a preference for re-
presenting what can be known, what can be spoken 
about and what can be seen, over what can be felt, 
experienced and done (Hinchcliffe, 2001, 2003; 
McCormack, 2003; Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000; 
Whatmore, 2002). As Thrift notes, NRT is a processual 
perspective concerned with ‘effectivity rather than 
representation: not the what, but the how’ (2000: 216, 
original emphasis). From this viewpoint, the sustained 
focus on law/culture as a relationship which is (or can 
be) captured in and through representational media 
(film, artworks, newspapers, trial transcripts, police 
reports and defense summations) is misplaced and 
obviates the `connective sensibilities’ (McCormack, 
2003: 489) of cultural-legal life – those relational and 
ontogenetic spaces which emerge from performativity, 
                                           
6
United States v Bianco, No. H-90-18 (AHN) (D. Conn. July 16, 1991) 
affect, desire, and corporeality
7
. To put this more 
bluntly, representation may have reached the point of 
‘diminishing theoretico-political returns …. What would 
one more decoding of a sign, symbol, or metaphor 
achieve?’ (Castree and MacMillan, 2004: 471).  
There is no need to buy into NRT
8
 to accept the 
point that ‘(r)epresentation is constitutively inadequate’ 
(Castree and MacMillan, 2004: 476) and it will always 
be exceeded by the legal-cultural world it seeks to 
capture. Even so, and whatever its limitations as an 
ontological and epistemological category, 
representation remains the primary vehicle for 
exposing, illustrating, evaluating and questioning 
law/culture relationalities and their embeddedness in 
the exercise of discursive power, processes of 
meaning-making, and practices of resistance
9
. In short, 
so long as the silenced, marginalised, excluded, and 
disempowered can be mis-represented, under-
represented, poorly-represented, or over-represented 
in matters of social and legal justice, there will be a 
need to engage in representational politics. 
Representation, then, is ‘intensely political …. It is at 
once dangerous and useful, incomplete and material, 
inclusive and exclusive’ (Castree and MacMillan, 2004: 
476). If, then, representation matters, then the task for 
law/culture scholarship is to remain vigilant about how 
it does so in all of its generative and performative 
complexities; as Prendergast notes: what is required is 
‘the constant renewal of a different, more judicious …. 
reflexive turning back on the concept (of 
representation)’ (2000: ix).  
A second concern arising from a commitment to a 
constitutive model and its attendant ‘politics of 
representation’, hinges on the absence of an account 
of political agency. Throughout the literature, 
assumptions are made about the intentionalities, 
motives and capacities of both producers and 
consumers of legal-cultural media, but with no 
                                           
7
An important exception to recognising the ‘erotics of law’ is found In 
Redhead’s monograph, Unpopular Cultures (1995). In the context of his review 
of the contribution of psychoanalysis to culturo-legal work, Redhead identifies 
the unexplored terrain of ‘legal desire’ (Redhead, 1995: 82). However, beyond 
an anticipation that such a line of enquiry might be ‘important and fruitful’ 
(Redhead, 1995: 82), the point is not elaborated beyond an entry in a glossary 
of terms; here, he suggests that an ‘erotics of law is the sexualisation of law, 
the way in which law itself becomes, desired, seduced and consumed’ 
(Redhead, 1995: 111). 
8
NRT does not come without health warnings, and there is no shortage of 
constructive criticism of its rejection of representationalism – see, for example, 
Castree and MacMillan (2004); Thien (2005); Tolia-Kelly (2006). For a specific 
discussion of the political value and impact of NRT, see Barnett (2008).  
9
Elsewhere, I have developed a concept of performance/choreography to make 
the case for retaining a representationalist orientation at the same time as 
embracing the insights of NRT and its emphasis on the performative and 
affective relations of culturo-legal life (Campbell, 2012). 
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questioning or analysis of how political subjectivities 
are formed; how the constitutive ‘realities’ of law/culture 
are intersubjectively communicated, negotiated and 
agreed; or who, indeed, has (more or less) political 
agency in this discursive exchange. So, for example, 
whether analyses are concerned with popular cultural 
representations of the legal regulation of paedophilia 
(Khan, 2009; Kohm and Greenhill, 2011), or the ethico-
political power of photographic imagery (Biber, 2006; 
Valier and Lippens, 2004; Valverde, 2006: 155-163), or 
the jurisprudential insights of Harry Potter, Legally 
Blonde and Million Dollar Baby (MacNeil, 2007), the 
approach has been one of reading for the legal-cultural 
subject, and speaking on behalf of the (putative) 
publics who, despite being the illusory effect of 
rhetorical strategies of representation, are implicated in 
these (same) representational worlds as audience. 
Though much of this scholarship is inflected by a 
poststructuralist orientation, which eschews simplistic 
notions of ‘media effects’, the political engagement of 
imagined spectators tends to be asserted rather than 
demonstrated. Where, for example, Brown suggests 
that prison film audiences are transformed to an 
‘engaged mode of citizenship’ (2009: 191), it is 
assumed that this transformation involves the 
movement from passive consumer to ethical witness of 
the work of punishment. How this shift in viewing 
position occurs is not explored; neither is there any 
questioning over whether the transformative moment 
may also be one in which the (already) ‘ethical viewer’ 
is repositioned as a pro-death penalty fundamentalist, 
or apathetic bystander. There is much, therefore, about 
contemporary law/culture analyses - despite its post-
credentials – which sustains the ethos of the ‘law as 
ideology’ movement and reproduces its political 
shortcomings. More than two decades have passed 
since Anthony Chase raised concerns about the 
political inadequacy of extant ‘law and ideology’ 
accounts; pointing to the ‘absence of a convincing legal 
sociology (or “reception theory”)’ (Chase, 1986: 544), 
he fully recognised the need to demonstrate the 
popular cultural currency of legal ideas, and to 
establish how, precisely, legal ideology ‘works’ through 
cultural forms to persuade and seduce 
readers/viewers. Such complaints remain relevant for 
contemporary work which continues to be hampered by 
the absence of an agential, representing subject. In 
short, if law/culture ‘is inscribed politically through the 
category of the subject as the constitutive locus of 
meaning and action’ (Dillon and Valentine, 2002: 5), 
then we should take seriously the situated practices 
and technologies of media reception.  
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
How, then, do we figure the politics of law/culture? I 
have argued that contemporary work has entered a 
post-political phase in which an hitherto tendency to 
characterise the politics of law/culture as an intractable 
and dichotomous, inter-disciplinary contest over 
meaning, interpretation and knowledge-production, has 
given way to a consensus over their (mutually) 
constitutive relationality. The discussion opened up to 
scrutiny the power dynamics of legal-cultural 
intersectionalities as manifest in a range of specific 
political projects – the politics of recognition; the politics 
of judgement; and the politics of representation. In 
each case, what is captured is the contingency, 
instability and fluidity of law/culture wherein different 
political aspirations – the pursuit of cultural justice; the 
adjudication of a right to asylum; the ‘forensic gaze’ of 
popular cultural media – rest on a shifting ground of 
political possibilities. So, for example, where we may 
have anticipated law/culture as a relationship of mutual 
accommodation in the determinations of juridico-
cultural rights and identities, in practice culture is 
admitted into politics only at the concessionary 
discretion of a sovereign law. Similarly, by overly 
focusing on the constitutive and assimilative power of 
legal-cultural media and practices, not only is critical 
reflexivity about representationalism lost; but the 
performative, affective and corporeal effects of 
representation in the domain of the ‘real’ tend to be 
ignored. Moreover, across these variegated political 
scenarios, legal-cultural subjects appear to be mere 
‘stakes in political games’ (Valentine, 2002: 53), rather 
than authoritative interlocutors and active contributors 
to the political cut and thrust of law/culture debates. 
Furthermore, though this discussion has offered a 
deconstructive mapping of the politicising and 
politicised scope of law/culture relationalities, it has 
failed to identify how such a variegated political 
landscape might ‘work’ to transform the ‘realpolitiks’ of, 
for example, security, justice, equality and rights. Put 
another way, it may be a little premature to think that 
law/culture has transcended the binary politics of 
antagonism and contestation; at best, we can postulate 
a rather open-ended and relativist notion of law/culture 
as an interstitial space of infinite political potentialities.  
From outset, I located the politicising force of 
law/culture within its capacity to create tension and 
disquiet for disciplinary purists. As a point of departure, 
this agonistic orientation foreshadows a number of 
politically-inflected issues concerning not only how this 
tension is played out across a myriad of legal-cultural 
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sites, but also for whom (both inside and outwith the 
academy), and in what ways, the law/culture dispute is 
problematic. It also raises more intriguing questions as 
to whether the disruptive and disquieting force of 
law/culture might sui generis constitute the mainspring 
of political practice and action. I will address each of 
these issues in turn. A continuing programme of 
empirical research which pays attention to the 
everyday contingencies and struggles of law/culture will 
certainly build on the kind of work already 
accomplished. Yet, given the need for a sustained and 
more nuanced focus on the power relations and 
political effects of highly situated (and mediated) events 
and practices, both a modified and an intensified 
perspective on power is called for. Modification comes 
through the use of alternative theories of power. 
Notably, this discussion has made no reference to 
Foucault’s thesis on governmental power despite its 
usage across a substantial body of research and 
analysis within criminology and socio-legal studies 
(Ashenden, 1996; Hunt, 1999; Lippert, 2002; O’Malley, 
1992; Stenson, 1993), as well as within cultural studies 
(Bennett, 1998; Simons, 2002; Valentine, 2002). 
Certainly, a governmental framework opens up the 
ground of law/culture as a space of practical politics 
where ‘counter-conducts’, conflicts and struggles over 
the sites, techniques, discourses and subjects of 
law/culture are rendered explicit as a problem for 
government. Mackenzie’s (2008) analysis of how the 
therapeutic jurisprudence of US drug courts mobilises 
an ethopolitics of pleasure is one of the few examples 
of a governmental approach to the relational spaces of 
law/culture. Here we find a detailed and eloquent 
account of the ways in which court practices and public 
health initiatives intersect and mediate cultural 
constructions of ‘pleasure’ in an ongoing politics of 
exclusion/inclusion. There are, of course, other theories 
of power available: for example, Latour’s (2005) work 
on actor-network theory turns attention to the 
connections and networks of social interaction, where 
power is conceptualised as an effect of the situated 
interpretations and meanings which emerge through 
interaction about (in this context) legal-cultural 
contingencies. Alternatively, theories of performative 
power (Butler, 1990, 1993, 2004), and affective power 
(Connolly, 2002; Deleuze, 1990; Deleuze and Guattari, 
1996; Massumi, 2002) open up novel, innovative and 
intellectually invigorating lines of inquiry which position 
the politics of law/culture within an understanding of the 
everyday flux of embodied, corporeal and emotional 
life.  
Indeed, these perspectives signal a more intensified 
concern not only for the power dynamics of agency, 
personhood, experience and resistance, but also for 
the range of subjectivities and identities which populate 
and inhabit the crowded political spaces of legal-
cultural worlds. For example, drawing on Butler’s thesis 
on performativity, Wilcox (2011) suggests that for those 
who are seriously concerned about the gendered 
politics of security, the need to problematise the 
meaning and nature of violence, and to trace the 
connections across violence, subjectivities and 
embodiment, has enormous implications for the way in 
which feminist culturo-legal work might rethink not only 
how security practices are gendered, but also how the 
very nature of `security’ has lent itself to particular 
conceptions of ‘the body’. These kinds of insights 
emerge from analyses which not only require an 
altogether more precise specification of the panoply of 
critical voices who (may) speak at the interstices of 
law/culture, but which also have the potential to explore 
their complex cartographies of power. 
All that said, I want to return to what is, perhaps, the 
more compelling or, at least, interesting prospect for 
law/culture analyses, especially in terms of making 
good use of an emerging (and not yet popularised) 
theoretical framework for thinking about political life. 
That is to say, the idea that law/culture is provocative 
and has an ‘edgy quality’ (Fitzpatrick, 2005: 2) has 
considerable resonance with Jacques Rancière’s thesis 
of a ‘politics of aesthetics’ (Rancière, 1999, 2004, 
2010). For Rancière, power is not co-extensive with 
politics; rather, politics emerge from ‘ontological 
conflicts’ over what he describes as the ‘distribution of 
the sensible’ – systems of divisions and boundaries 
which define the nature of things and how things may 
be thought, desired, done, experienced and felt within a 
particular aesthetic regime. From this perspective, how 
power is exchanged and exercised within and across 
the law/culture dyad is of less analytical interest than 
the ‘stuff’ of disagreements and dissensus about what 
is thinkable, sayable, doable, legible, scriptible and 
visible in the name of justice (or freedom, equality, 
rights, fairness and so on). Using Rancière to critically 
appraise the intersections of law/culture involves, then, 
an exploration of moments of aesthetic disturbance - 
that is, those events and practices, representations and 
statements, images and symbols, materialities and 
affects which unsettle our sensibilities and destabilise 
the established categories and definitions of ‘justice’ 
with which we may have become (all too) accustomed.  
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